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Motor-fuel tax revenues have been stagnant or declining nationwide, and the purchasing 
power of those revenues has continued to decrease. Transportation and infrastructure are 
important backbones of the American economy, and as cars become more fuel-efficient and 
electric vehicles become more and more commonplace, gas tax revenues may continue to fall. A 
change in how roads are financed may occur. This research is to answer whether the gas tax is 
still a viable means of funding transportation finance in Ohio, and if not, what alternatives could 
work?  
The research was conducted by looking at existing research through a thorough literature 
review that provides a bigger picture of the issues facing the motor-fuel tax today. This extensive 
literature review revealed many things to me about the motor-fuel tax. The history of the gas tax 
and why it was chosen as the staple of transportation finance because of its easy and cheap 
implementation. I also learned why the gas tax is important, and the negative consequences 
deteriorating roads can have on an economy. One of the major damages to the gas tax is from 
increasing fuel efficiency- which has decreased the purchasing power of gas tax revenues by 
almost two-thirds. This points to a severe need for a change in how transportation finance is 
done. 
This project concluded with an analysis made up of three parts. First examining electric 
vehicle fees (EV fees) and pilot programs. Pilot programs have been implemented by several 
states to study mileage-based user fees (MBUFS) as an alternative to the gas tax. The EV fee 
portion includes evaluating if Ohio’s current fee is adequate for capturing road usage. The 
second section examines the potential indexation of the gas tax to inflation to increase revenues. 
Lastly, it will take the pilot programs done by several states to determine if there is a future in 
MBUFS as an alternative to the gas tax. This analysis evaluates alternatives to the gas tax, and 









The Gas Tax Problem 
 
The declining conditions of Ohio’s infrastructure, primarily its roads and highways, have 
been in the news frequently. To deal with these problems, Ohio’s governor, Mike DeWine 
pressed the State Assembly to raise the state gas tax by 18 cents, and to index the tax to inflation 
for the future. He was not entirely successful. House Bill 62 increased the gas tax by 10.5 cents 
per gallon, to 38.5 cents, and the diesel tax by 19 cents, to 47 cents a gallon, effective July 1, 
2019. The bill did not index the tax to inflation. But the increased revenue will be used to fund 
state and local highway and street improvements. 
 An increase in the gas tax was a response to a long-standing problem for the Ohio 
Department of Transportation (ODOT) and its ability to maintain and improve Ohio’s roads. 
Jerry Wray is a former director of ODOT and the only two-time appointed director in Ohio’s 
history. Director Wray made a plea for more funding for ODOT. He and other professionals 
point out that Ohio’s highways are essential to keeping and creating new jobs (Wray, 2016) 
(Wachs, 2006). In addition, ODOT faces continual budget shortfalls, which continue still despite 
the gas tax increase. Director Wray warns that budget shortfalls force high-priority projects to 
face serious completion delays. The longer construction jobs are postponed, the more added 
costs they will accumulate as well. Is, and if so why, is the revenue of the gas tax insufficient to 
serve state needs in Ohio? What alternatives might be able to compensate for the falling gas tax 
revenue? This case study will aim to answer these questions by reviewing academic and 
practitioner literatures, and by reviewing the experience of other states. Section One provides a 
case study of the gas tax in Ohio, which provides the context and details about the issues faced 
by Ohio. The next section provides a literature review of the theoretical and practical issues of 
the gas tax.  Section Three describes the case study approach used in this research to identify a 
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set of states in the US whose experience with the gas tax could provide insights for Ohio.  
Section Four provides our analysis and discussion of the results. Finally, Section Five makes 
suggestions for Ohio based upon the findings of this paper. 
 
Ohio Case Study 
Like many other states, Ohio has struggled with falling gas tax revenue due to a variety 
of factors. Across the nation professionals and government officials are looking for suitable 
replacements or supplements to the gas tax. This case study will describe the history of the gas 
tax in Ohio and describe when it first began to receive criticism on its performance. Then it will 
describe the underlying issues in Ohio which are causing the gas tax to be less viable. Lastly, this 
case study will set up how this issue is not just in Ohio, but that it is occurring on a national 
level. 
In 1919 the very first gas tax was introduced to fund public roads in Oregon. Ohio’s first 
tax on motor fuel was enacted at a rate of 2 cents per gallon six years later in 1925. The gas tax 
was quickly adopted across the country rapidly for several reasons. It was an effective means of 
assessing motorists for their use of highways, since at the time gasoline consumption correlated 
directly with miles traveled, vehicle speed, and vehicle weight, and the cost to build and maintain 
roads was known to be a function of these factors (Brown, 2001). Other options, like fees on 
vehicle miles traveled or ton-miles traveled, although better recorders of road usage, were not 
feasible at the time because of technological and administrative limitations in the 1920’s. 
Another advantage was that the gas tax applied to everyone who drove through a state, not just 
the citizens of the state. This made the gas tax a very equitable option. In its early years, the 
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gasoline tax was politically popular. The petroleum industry, automobile industry, construction 
industry, and driving public all embraced the tax because of its direct link to more and better 
roads (Brown, 2001).  
The gas tax has faced critics since its inception, although more recently the criticism has 
been more grounded due to the declining revenues. Early on, there were fears that high taxes on 
gasoline would limit or encourage drivers to move on from gasoline. These fears were not 
widespread however and were mainly held by those in the petroleum lobbying community. Favor 
for the gas tax really started to dwindle during the Great Depression, when gas tax revenues were 
diverted to help with unemployment and public welfare. In this paper the diverting of gas tax 
funds will be referred to as “fungibility”. Up until that point it was just assumed gas tax revenue 
should be used to fund roads, so there was no requirements or stipulations of how the money 
should be spent. Soon after, any legislation raising the gas tax met the same public view as all tax 
increases typically do- disapproval. Ever since, gas tax increases happen occasionally as they are 
truly necessitated but are often infrequent and are not indexed with inflation (see Figure 1). 
Ohio’s history of gas tax increases is brief, considering it covers a 95-year span. Counting the 
recent gas tax increase in 2019 by the DeWine administration, the gas tax has only been raised 6 
times since its beginning in 1925 (As seen in Figure 1 below).  
 To remain effective, the gas tax needed periodic increases due to the problem of inflation. 
Most often motor-fuel taxes are structured as a fixed cent-per-gallon rate (like in Ohio). 
However, 22 states have variable-rate gas taxes that adjust, to some degree, with inflation or 
prices without regular legislative action (NCSL, 2020). Since Ohio’s gas tax is not indexed to 
inflation, it doesn’t automatically adjust. When gas tax revenues start to lose their value, the 
Ohio Legislature has to initiate a new bill to further raise the gas tax in order to keep up with 
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inflation. Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT) are directly linked to gas tax revenues. The more 
individuals drive, the more fuel they consume, which contributes more the gas tax revenue. VMT 
has changed a lot since the establishment of the gas tax. For example, in 1956 national VMT was 
estimated at 750 billion, but in recent years has climbed as high as 3 trillion. In fact, what VMT 
means for road conditions has changed a lot just since 2003. The weight of vehicles (especially 
large shipping trucks) and the speeds at which vehicles can travel have continued to increase in 
recent years. Due to this increased and tougher usage of roads, the damage to roads increases. 
While recorded VMT has not increased by much over the last 20 years (see Figure 2), the rate of 
deterioration to roads has continued to grow. When coupled with inflation it is understandable 
how quickly the gas tax rate can fall behind what is needed to maintain and grow our roads. This 
boils down to less money in revenues but more to pay for than ever before. 
In the past, the highway system has proved to be a powerful tool in the growth of the 
American and Ohio economy, and the highway system relies on gas tax funds to keep it running. 
So why is there any concern as to the strength of the gas tax today? Below Figure 3 helps to 
explain part of the problem in Ohio. Figure 3 considers real gas tax revenues 1994-2014 and 
suggests real gas tax revenues have decreased over time by 7.3% for the overall period, and by 
3.8% more recently. There are many reasons this may be happening; increased fuel efficiency, 
rising number of electric vehicles, bigger and faster vehicles, and inflation are all possible 
problems. Figure 3 displays Ohio’s tax revenues have been stagnant, while accounting for 
inflation.  
Declines in revenue mean that Ohio has few funds available for new construction. 
According to ODOT, 93% of their construction money was targeted to solely to preservation 
work (ODOT 2015 Annual Report and 2016-2017 Business Plan). While raising the gas tax is a 
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short-term solution to declining tax revenues, it may not be a viable or equitable solution in the 
long-term. In 2017 the American Council of Engineering Companies of Ohio (ACEC of Ohio) 
published a research paper on gave the organization’s position relative to highway infrastructure 
condition and funding. They point out that “According to ODOT, 93% of ODOT’s time, money 
and labor are devoted to preserving and improving the more than 43,000 miles of roads and 
14,000 bridges on the state system” (ODOT Facts Book 2016). This means that little of what 
ODOT does is dedicated to growth, which Director Wray pointed out was vital for jobs in Ohio. 
The ACEC of Ohio offers up a variety of potential solutions in the closing of its paper: The 
increase of vehicle registration fees, further raising of the gas tax, allowing Transportation 
Improvement Districts (TIDs) to generate their own revenue, a vehicle mile tax (VMT), and/or to 
eliminate gas tax spending on bike paths or other non-highway resources. Several of these will 
be evaluated later in this paper, but the ACEC gave a semi-comprehensive list of the popular 
alternative transportation financing tools.  
 Ohio’s gas tax has faced declining revenues, due to increased fuel-efficiency, inflation, 
the increased movement to and choices in electric vehicles, the development of large truck fleets, 
and the failure of the Highway Trust Fund (HTF) to adequately fund itself. One example of the 
increasing wear and tear on Ohio’s roads without equivalent gas tax revenues is an ODOT 
projection of trucking capacity. Total freight volumes are expected to escalate from 1.4 billion 
tons in 2007 to 2.0 billion tons in 2040. The subsequent demands for capacity creation will put 
further stress on Ohio’s network of interstates and other roadways. It is also important to 
understand what is going on with the traffic and roads in Ohio is the vehicle makeup. Average 
weight of a vehicle is increasing as S.U.V.s and pickup trucks now make up 70% of the market 
nationally. Like trucking, this also contributes to the further deterioration of roads, but since fuel 
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efficiency is rising at the same time, the costs to manage Ohio’s roadways is outpacing the gas 
tax revenues.  
 Since the creation of Ohio’s gas tax in 1925, there have been many changes on Ohio’s 
roadways that affect the effectiveness of the gas tax. Ohio is dealing with increased fuel 
efficiency, increased vehicle weight, increased road deterioration, increased alternative fuel 
vehicles, and declining gas tax revenues. These factors are important because the situation in 
Ohio is reflective of the issues facing the gas tax across the whole of the United States. Many 
states are encountering transportation budget shortages, including at the federal level. There is 
also a clear need for more funding, not less. In its recent report on America’s roadways and 
bridges, the American Society of Civil Engineers graded a D for our highways and a C+ for our 
bridges. They also pointed out the need for another $79 billion per year in new investment. This 
raises a series of questions that motivate this research project and will be investigated. Is the 
motor-fuel tax still an effective user-fee for Ohio transportation funding needs? If not, what are 
some viable alternatives that could be implemented in Ohio? In search of these answers, there are 
further questions to be raised. What data can give insight into the viability of the gas tax? What 
factors determine viable alternatives to the gas tax? These must be investigated to answer the 











The issues with the motor fuel tax presented in the Ohio case study are not unique to 
Ohio but are reflected on a national scale. The motor-fuel tax is the primary source of funding for 
all road and highway infrastructure in the United States. Section A of this literature review 
discusses the economics of the gas tax and other user fees as well as the potential regressivity of 
user fees; Next, Section B illustrates the current failures of the gas tax as described in the 
transportation finance literature, and why it may no longer operate as a user fee. Finally, Section 
C suggests possible alternative funding mechanisms or solutions, as well as describes the ways 
these different options might be evaluated.  
 
Section A: The Economics of User Fees 
User fees are fees, taxes, or impost payments paid to a facility owner or operator by a 
facility user. The gas tax had long been a prime example of a user fee; and has often been 
described by public finance economists as the ideal for government revenue raising. Finance 
instruments based on user fees are considered fair because they charge individuals for how much 
they use, rather than a flat rate. This way, those who use the roads more (and thus contribute to 
more deterioration) pay more for that increased use, and those who do not drive do not have to 
pay at all. User fees encourage efficient use of whatever facility by making clear the relationship 
between costs and benefits of using the facility, which allows users to make informed decisions. 
The gas tax was in a way, the original user fee (Brown, 2001). It was an effective means of 
assessing motorists for their use of highways, because gasoline consumption correlates directly 
with miles traveled, vehicle weight, and vehicle speed, and the cost to build and maintain roads 
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was known to be a function of these factors. Alternatives, such as fees for vehicle miles traveled 
or ton-miles traveled, although better recorders of road usage, were not feasible because of 
technological and administrative limitations in the 1920’s. The gas tax also applied to everyone 
who bought gasoline in an area, including drivers from other states. For example, in the Rocky 
Mountain region, out-of-state motorists account for as much as half of all automobile travel 
(Brown, 2001). Finally, finance instruments not based on user fees may be unfair because 
individuals who do not use the transportation system are required to subsidize those who do.  
Another reason the gas tax was chosen over its alternatives, was the cost of 
administration. Part of why the gas tax was so popular of a way to raise highway funds was that 
the cost to administer it was very low, and this remains true today. Gas tax revenues are collected 
at the same time as fuel is pumped; consumers are often not conscious of paying the gas tax, as it 
is built into the cost of fuel. Some of the alternatives we will look at for current day were not 
feasible at the time due to technological limits of the time. One such example is GPS tracking, 
which wasn’t invented until the 1970’s (NASA, 2017). When considering alternatives, cost of 
administration will be an important characteristic. 
The regressive nature of the gas tax has been debated several times (Chernick and 
Reschovsky, 1997; Duff, 2004). Although arguments have been made to the severity of this 
regressive nature, the gas tax is regressive. It takes a proportionally greater amount from 
individuals of lower incomes. This is certainly worth consideration when analyzing the gas tax, 
but it must also be stated that user fees as a whole are often criticized for being regressive, and 
most alternatives to the gas tax being examined nationwide are user fees. One of the potential 
issues with the gas tax today is that it may no longer be operating as a true user fee.
 Economic theory of the motor fuel tax suggests such taxes are regressive in nature, that is 
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the gas tax places disproportionate burden on the poor. Howard Chernick and Andrew 
Reschovsky consider the potential regressivity of the gas tax. They question the regressivity of 
the gasoline tax on the grounds that using annual instead of lifetime income and consumption 
data can lead to a substantial overestimate of regressivity. Instead they suggest that the regressive 
nature of these taxes should be evaluated in the middle ground between lifetime and annual 
incomes. When individuals are grouped into 11-year average income deciles, average gasoline 
tax burdens are only slightly less regressive than annual tax burdens. The main reason for the 
similarity of annual and intermediate run burdens is the limited degree of income mobility over 
an 11-year period (Chernick and Reschovsky, 1997). Considering the regressivity of the gas tax 
in the long term does reduce the overall regressivity, but only slightly.  
 David Duff discusses user fees and adopts an even-handed approach to benefit taxation, 
regarding benefit taxes and user fees as preferable to general taxation for specific purposes but 
inferior to general taxes for other reasons. Duff divides taxes into two generalized categories; the 
first being general taxes, mandatory levies that are not related to any specific benefit or service. 
The other category is user fees (like the gas tax), which are to an extent voluntary levies imposed 
for particular benefits of public goods and government services (Duff, 2004). Not every tax fits 
cleanly into one category or the other, but it does encapsulate the large majority of taxes well. An 
advantage of benefit taxes is their efficiency, a primary goal of traditional tax and public policy. 
User fees or benefit taxes are a practical approach to efficiency, as it ensures the combination of 
government spending and the distribution of taxes that fund that spending achieve an 
economically efficient result. Duff also identifies accountability as another benefit to user fees. 
By linking the supply of public goods to the costs of maintaining and creating them, it creates 
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accountability for both the government and for the public. What is being taxed and where the 
revenue goes to have clear answers.     
Duff concludes his research by saying that “user fees are neither the panacea for public 
finance that some imagine them to be nor the ‘reactionary’ levies that others denounce. On the 
contrary, as this article has argued, they are simply one method of raising government revenue 
that may be appropriate in some circumstances and inappropriate in others” (Duff, 2004). He 
suggests that these types of levies may be regressive, but if so, this can be addressed with 
compensatory measures designed to offset increased burdens on low-income groups. In general 
user fees do not work for financing pure public goods that are non-rival and non-excludable. An 
example of this is military funding. Everyone in a nation benefits from the protection of their 
nation, and so it would not make sense to pay this on a use basis. Duff also says public housing, 
police, fire protection, and other social services would be inappropriate for user fee funding. This 
is because social services are meant to be solely redistributive, which is why benefit taxation is 
not fit for them. Duff argues transportation, water, and sewage are all especially fitting to be user 
fees. However, the gas tax may no longer operate effectively as a user fee, which will be 








Section B: The Failure of the Gas Tax Today 
There is a large consensus that the gas tax no longer covers all the direct and indirect 
costs imposed on the U.S. infrastructure system (Goldman and Wachs, 2003; Parry and Small, 
2005; TRB, 2006; Delucchi, 2007; Jerome Dumortier, Fengxiu Zhang, John Marron 2016). 
There are a variety of reasons. For one, the gas tax may no longer operate as a true user fee, 
which if true, creates inefficiencies and may add to the potential regressive nature of gas taxes. 
This is because not all highway users in Ohio, or the United States as a whole, pay the gas tax, or 
alternatively, users may pay at varying rates. This is a result of more fuel-efficient cars, in 
particular, the increased use of electric and hybrid vehicles. 
 Martin Wachs makes a similar point, as he attempts to raise awareness for the gas tax 
issue. There is a need for tax revenue to be increasing over time, rather than stagnant or 
decreasing. Wachs says that as the highway system grows, so does the cost of maintaining 
existing roads. Worsening congestion is a product of having to dedicate funding to maintain the 
existing roads, with nothing left to expand or innovate (Wachs, 2006). This means that little of 
what transportation agencies are funding is dedicated to growth. Not having enough funding to 
take on new projects and improvements hurts job growth and leads to increased traffic 
congestion. The costs to maintain will only rise, which will lead to shrinking funds dedicated 
towards new projects. Current gas tax revenue trends are a problem if they cannot fund new 
projects that decrease congestion, let alone be able to adequately maintain the existing highway 
system. Wachs overall conclusion is that the gas tax is linked to highway usage but not to 




The gas tax has been used in America for over a hundred years. To understand the current 
issues with the gas tax it is important to get a better understanding on the origins of the gas tax, 
and why it has been such a long-standing mechanism. Katz and Puentes establish in their paper 
the history of the gas tax at a national level, how the gas tax has been the clear leader for funding 
highways since its inception, that there is a lack of funding for highways today, and that bond 
usage as a means of financing highway spending has increased rapidly in the last 20 years (Katz 
and Puentes, 2005). Increased debt-funding of highways is a clear indicator that transportation 
agencies are having to get creative with funding to keep revenues up. A severe problem for 
transportation finance is that the purchasing power of the declining revenues has continued to 
decrease (see Figure 4). Figure 4 begins in 1993 because that is the last time the federal gas tax 
was raised. The purchasing power dropping 64 percent since then is a clear indicator that fuel 
efficiency and other factors are eroding the gas tax, not only in states like Ohio but at a national 
scale. 
Jonathan Williams points out that the Highway Trust Fund (HTF) was established under 
Eisenhower as a temporary funding instrument but is (Williams, 2007). It was established to 
build the interstate system Eisenhower advocated for, and although it was meant to be a 
temporary system, it is still in use today. Part of the reason for this is that it took much longer to 
complete the construction on the highway system than the Executive branch or Congress had 
thought. The HTF has come under much scrutiny since the Great Recession, due to its new 
reliance on government transfers mentioned in the Ohio case study (John Paul Helveston, 2017). 
The HTF is a funding mechanism that collects the federal gas tax and other fees, and then 
disperses those fees to each state according to their contributions, as a way of supplementing 
state highway funding. Part of the reasoning for this fiscal federalism is that many highway 
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projects extend over state lines, and when it comes to a discussion of who pays it is easiest to 
have a Federal branch of transportation that oversees such projects, although a large percentage 
of the funds are just redistributed to state’s based on their contributions. Jeff Davis asks if a 
never-ending series of bailouts of the HTF by general revenues is the best way to fund future 
infrastructure investments? Ever since the Great Recession the HTF has been receiving transfers 
from general revenue to help maintain its commitments to supplementing state transportation 
budgets.  
Starting in 2008 the Highway Trust Fund (HTF) began receiving transfers from general 
revenue (Figure 5) so that it could continue to meet its commitments to states’ funding. Ever 
since the Great Recession the federal gas tax revenue has not covered the HTF’s commitments, 
and thus it has had transfers from the federal government. The HTF’s commitments are largely 
supplementing state transportation budgets with the federal gas tax revenue. While some were 
already advocating moving on from the gas tax, these transfers have raised national awareness in 
the political and transportation communities that the gas tax is not preforming as strongly as 
expected.  
Every state receives a portion of its funding from the HTF. In 2018, ODOT received 
$2.04 billion from the HTF, and it generated $1.9 billion in state gas tax revenue (ODOT Annual 
Statement, 2018). Highway Trust Fund contributions annually account for a major portion of 
Ohio’s infrastructure finance, which explains the concern Ohio, and many other states have, with 
the deterioration of revenues (specifically fuel-tax revenues), in the HTF. The Oregon DOT (also 
shorthanded as ODOT) received 23 percent of its funding from 2017 to 2019 from the federal 
government as well (Oregon Department of Transportation, 2019). The decline of the HTF’s 
revenues poses a serious risk to many states. Davis finds in his paper that revenue for the HTF is 
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projected to be approximately $39 billion per year over the next decade, and in 2014 the HTF's 
spending commitments totaled $51 billion (Davis, 2014). That is a $12 billion dollar deficit in 
the first year alone. There is clearly a funding issue with the gas tax, both at the state and federal 
levels (Katz and Puentes, 2005; Puentes and Tomer, 2008; Duncan and Graham, 2013; John Paul 
Helveston, 2017). 
There have been no major efforts to raise the federal motor fuels tax since President 
Clinton’s administration. With the HTF consistently needing transfers to stay afloat, it would 
seem logical to raise the federal gas tax to compensate. Important to note though, President 
Clinton succeeded in getting his deficit reduction plan approved by Congress yes, but only after 
Al Gore cast the tie-breaking vote to pass the raise. This detail is important because it illustrates 
another issue with the gas tax that is shared by many other taxes. Opposition to increases. Both at 
the state and federal level it is commonly hard to raise the gas tax. Colorado is another such 
example, the last time their gas tax was raised was 24 years ago. This is a smaller, but still 
contributing factor to the decline of gas tax revenues.  
Some argue that gas tax revenue being diverted to non-highway uses is a problem for 
transportation funding. Jonathan Williams gives numerous examples of gas tax revenue being 
spent on public education, museums, and graffiti removal (Williams, 2007). This may be a 
contributing factor to problems in some state’s transportation financing. Figure 6 shows the 
percent of state gas taxes and vehicle fees that are diverted to non-highway uses. While it is clear 
that many states divert there funds to other causes, this graph shows that reducing spending on 
non-highway projects is not a real option for states like Indiana, Ohio, or West Virginia, 
regardless of it being a problem for some states. Low fungibility means there is little money not 
spent on maintaining or improving roads by the state government. However, this may also point 
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back to an inefficiency with the Highway Trust Fund. That inefficiency is that it may be 
overcontributing to funding in states that may not be allocating those funds to transportation 
projects at all or using the federal funds to open up their own highway funds for other uses.  
 Robert Kirk and William Mallet discuss another issue facing the gas tax today. Kirk and 
Mallet find that expanding fleets of hybrid and electric vehicles are likely to raise equity issues 
for transportation finance. The issue with expanding electric vehicle fleets is likely to only grow 
as well. There were only 3 models of electric vehicles in 2010, and in 2017 there were 25 models 
(Kirk and Mallet, 2020). More and more manufacturers are producing electric and hybrid 
vehicles to meet demand, and the efficiency and quality of these vehicles is growing as well. 
According to ODOT’s 2019 Annual Report, as many as 1/3 of all vehicles on the road are 
projected to be electric vehicles by 2040. This will likely lead to even further revenue declines. 
Their paper also discusses the issue that improving fuel economy poses to gas tax revenues. 
Improved fuel economy is slowly reducing the average amount of fuel used per mile of travel. 
The CBO projects that from FY2021 to FY2026 the gap between transportation revenues and 
spending will average roughly $18 billion annually. Figure 7 displays the fuel-efficiency 
problem facing the gas tax. Cars and trucks have continued to improve in miles per gallon of fuel 
rapidly. This steadily rising MPG poses a serious problem for gas tax revenues. Drivers being 
able to drive farther on less fuel means an increased need for road maintenance and decreasing 
gas tax revenues. Together, those two factors pose a significant problem to transportation 
agencies in how they manage highway infrastructure. The Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) confirms this, as they say manufacturers have made significant improvement in fuel 
economy and carbon emissions in the last 5 years alone (EPA Automotive Trends, 2019).  
19 
 
 The EPA’s automotive trends report (Figures 7 and 8) shows that average fuel-efficiency 
has increased by 1 mile per gallon over the last 5 years, with some manufacturer’s achieving as 
many as 2 or 3 mile per gallon improvements to their fuel-efficiency. Since 2004, fuel-efficiency 
has increased thirty percent. Yet as stated earlier in this paper, the gas tax has not been raised at 
the federal level since 1993, and while many states have raised their taxes in recent years, they 
have not been keeping pace with the variety of issues facing the motor-fuel tax as a whole.  
 
Part C: Alternatives to the Gas Tax 
There are a variety of alternatives offered to the gas tax. Some suggest the more 
widespread use of toll roads, while others point to a flat fee or supplements to the gas tax such as 
indexing to inflation. A vehicle-miles traveled tax (VMT) or mileage-based user fee (MBUF) are 
the most frequently advocated, but there is an assortment of options in the technology and 
implementation of VMT taxes. These many alternatives must be evaluated on not only how 
realistic their implementation might be, but the political feasibility of the options as well. On-
board computers, global positioning systems (GPS), digital maps, and wireless communications 
all are technologies that now make it relatively easy and cheap to measure and record vehicle 
travel by road segment and time of day (Sorensen and Taylor, 2005). This opens the door to 
many pricing options long proposed by transportation economists but never before deemed 
feasible or practical. The problems facing these options is the political and public acceptability, 
namely when it comes to individual’s privacy. 
The Oregon Department of Transportation conducted a pilot program to study two 
strategies entitled “the Oregon Mileage Fee Concept”. The overall goal of this study was to 
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investigate the feasibility of replacing the gas tax with a mileage-based fee based on miles driven 
in Oregon and collected these fees at fueling stations. The findings of this test were very positive. 
The program showed that the new mileage fee could be paid at the pump, with minimal 
differences in the administration for motorists, compared to how they pay the gas tax. The study 
was also able to abide by several privacy goals- no specific vehicle point location or trip data 
could be stored or transmitted, all on-vehicle device communication must be short range, and the 
only centrally-stored data needed to assess mileage fees were vehicle identification, zone 
mileage totals for each vehicle and the amount of fuel purchased (Whitty, 2007). One of the key 
concerns for many when first considering a mileage- based tax was the invasive nature of 
tracking someone’s driving. These privacy commitments help to reduce that concern with 
assurances of what information is taken and what it can be used for. Perhaps the most promising 
finding of this pilot program was the low cost of implementation of the mileage-based tax. 
Service station capital costs include installing the mileage reading equipment while operating 
costs include communications of the mileage information with a central database in order to 
calculate mileage fees and modifications to the station’s point-of-sale system. On-vehicle capital 
costs will be determined by auto manufacturers and included in the price of new vehicles. ODOT 
will incur operating costs for auditing and providing technical assistance to service stations and 
motorists. Auditing should cost $1.0 million annually, a small fraction of the expected annual 
mileage fee revenue. Also, capital costs were considered as part of the evaluation. ODOT’s 
economist concluded in 2003 that the estimated $33 million in capital costs for statewide 
implementation would result in less than a two percent increase in the mileage fee rate, 
comparable to the existing fuel tax payment of the average passenger vehicle (Whitty, 2007). 
This means that implementation of the new system would be relatively cheap, especially when 
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compared to the increased tax revenue to be gained by making the switch from gas tax to 
mileage-based fees.  
The Michigan Ohio University Transportation Center published a paper that specifically 
looked at the impact electric vehicles were having on the gas tax and the possible 
implementation of MBUFs as an alternative to the gas tax (Dutta and Patel, 2012). Their study 
concluded that a mileage-based user fee (MBUF) is the definitive way to provide Transportation 
infrastructure funding. This is due to several main points that they believe make MBUFs the 
clear choice for funding moving forward. One such point is fairness. The current tax system 
charges road users based on fuel consumption, so if the vehicle fuel efficiency was low, drivers 
would be paying more in taxes compared to drivers with very efficient vehicles. Their conclusion 
is that it would be unfair to charge different individuals varying amounts for the same amount of 
road usage. The MBUF system would charge all drivers equally, regardless of the type of fuel 
and different efficiencies of their vehicles. 
The recommendations that came from the Dutta and Patel paper proposed a specific 
method of MBUF that was reviewed by Allen Greenberg of the USDOT, who is an authority on 
MBUFs. Greenberg saw this method as an acceptable/doable approach. The approach they 
suggested was GPS based, which would solely record distance traveled. The billing would be 
done by mailing invoices based on the time and zone of travel at the end of each month, which is 
similar to how many Americans handle payment of telephone, gas and electricity bills. Since this 
paper was published, the digital age has grown even more. A byproduct of that is many bills 
today are payed digitally, as individuals are relying less and less on physical mail for their billing 
and payment. So likely an option for digital payment of an individual’s MBUF would be added 
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to this approach. The notable increase in cost of administration with this approach is because of 
the need to install on board technology into vehicles to track the mileage.  
Tolling is another option which has undeniable merits, proven by its use in 34 different 
states within America. The International Bridge, Tunnel and Turnpike Association advocates for 
wider use of toll roads on its website ibtta.org. They point out that it is generally accepted that 
our iconic highways, such as Los Angeles’ 110 Freeway and the Capital Beltway around 
Washington, D.C., need major overhauling or reconstruction. The structural problem beneath our 
crumbling roadways: our method of funding highway infrastructure is failing, and there is little 
appetite or good reason for increasing the gas tax. Highway tolling is a proven, reliable funding 
method, but unfortunately federal law does not allow states to use toll roads to rebuild existing 
lanes of interstate highways. 
 There are several major points about toll roads that highlight both the benefits and 
drawbacks of using toll roads. First, a toll road operates as a user fee, not a tax. This makes toll 
roads efficient and fair, as you only pay for how much you use them. Second, electronic tolling is 
far improved from the early forms of toll roads. This means no congestion and no delays. All 
electronic tolling also improves local air quality by reducing idling and congestion. Tolling used 
to be a barrier to mobility because you had to stop and wait to pay your toll. Third, toll roads 
maintain privacy. Toll road customers can rest safe knowing their personal information and 
privacy is respected, and legally protected, by the toll agencies. While tolling has many merits, 
there is a common issue that has and will likely continue to keep tolling as a minor part of the 
infrastructure financing hierarchy. The logistics of making most or all roads operate as toll roads 
is not feasible, due to capital costs, public opinion, legislative opinion, and ease of 
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implementation or transition. Since roads are generally considered a public good, it is unrealistic 
to advocate for major privatization. 
 The gas tax is the central funding mechanism for transportation in the U.S. and 
nationwide states and researchers are investigating alternatives to the gas tax. This is because it 
has become clear that while the gas tax has been a great tool for many years, the direction that 
vehicle technology and public finance are going means moving away from the gas tax in the long 
term. The analysis of this research will point out why the gas tax is failing, and then identify 
several alternatives to the gas tax. Then it will identify the best option for Ohio and make 




This research uses a case study approach to evaluate the viability of the motor-fuel tax in 
Ohio. By analyzing other states’ experience with the gas tax relative to Ohio, it is possible to 
determine what the future might hold and what policies might be advantageous for Ohio. To 
choose states that would give insight for Ohio, selection criteria were created that would help 
capture a variety of states; several that are very similar to Ohio for comparison, and several that 
are more varied and provide contrast to Ohio. These selection criteria include highway 
management rankings, gas tax revenue per miles of road, vehicle miles traveled (VMT) per 
capita, population, geography (compared to Ohio’s), and electric vehicle (EV) market share. All 
criteria for selection are based on the characteristics of the state. A second set of criteria was also 
developed, to evaluate the states chosen with the selection criteria. This set of evaluation criteria 
help analyze different policy approaches compared to Ohio’s. These criteria are primarily policy 
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decisions such as indexing gas taxes to inflation, EV fees, conducting pilot programs, and 
fungibility of gas tax revenues. Elements of selection criteria such as EV market share and gas 
tax revenues will be relevant during evaluation to examine the effects of these different policy 
decisions.  
The selection criteria (see Table 1) helped produce a varied group of states for 
comparison with Ohio. Some of the characteristics of these states have a great effect on gas tax 
revenue like geography, population, miles of road, and VMT. Other characteristics such as EV 
market share, gas tax revenue, and highway condition rankings are impacted by some of the 
policies that appear in the evaluation criteria. In the analysis portion of this paper, the evaluation 
criteria will be used to evaluate what policy approaches Ohio should consider adopting, and 
whether these approaches provide long term solutions or not. The analysis will inform policy 
recommendations for the state of Ohio moving forward.  
The selection criteria were created to capture two types of states: states that are similar to 
Ohio in categories such as population, gas tax revenue, and miles of road (see Table 2). 
Pennsylvania and Michigan were both selected because their populations, geographies, and miles 
of road were all close to Ohio’s. They also have similar market shares of electric vehicles. Since 
their circumstances are very similar to Ohio’s it makes it easier to compare the differences they 
have in policy and what the effects of those differences are. The other type of state the selection 
criteria aimed to capture were states that had little in common with Ohio but have experience 
with issues that are likely to inform Ohio’s future. These states are California, Colorado, and 
Oregon. California has the largest EV market share in the nation at 8% as seen in Table 1, which 
gives a valuable contrast to Ohio at only 1%. Colorado and Oregon both have larger EV market 
shares than Ohio but are closer in population size and miles of road than California. All three of 
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these states have also conducted pilot programs, which means they are actively testing 
alternatives to the gas tax. Having this second grouping of states selected aid the evaluation by 
getting a broader picture of other situations and circumstances that Ohio is not experiencing yet 
but could experience in the near future.  
The evaluation criteria observe the states seen in Table 2 and help enable analysis of the 
different policy approaches, to determine what does and does not work in addressing declining 
gas tax revenues. Some of the criteria selected to evaluate these states are policies that help 
supplement or refine the gas tax, and others are- pilot programs which explore alternatives to the 
gas tax. To help increase gas tax revenues many states have indexed their gas taxes to inflation. 
Indexing the gas tax for inflation is important to maintain purchasing power of gas tax revenues; 
a variety of methods will be considered. Registration fees for alternative fuel vehicles is one 
example of a method of supplementing gas tax revenues, by generating additional transportation 
funds when electric vehicle owners register their vehicle; states chosen have taken a variety of 
approaches. The success of different policy approaches can be evaluated by how gas tax 
revenues respond. It will also be important to consider EV market share, as this can have an 
impact on gas tax revenues regardless how high the gas tax is raised. Pilot programs indicate that 
a state is considering alternatives to replace the gas tax, rather than supplement it. California, 
Colorado, and Oregon have all conducted pilot studies of different variations of a vehicle-miles 
traveled (VMT) tax. Analyzing these different pilot programs can also aid in the evaluation of 
the future of the gas tax in Ohio.  
To perform analysis it was vital to select states both similar and dissimilar to Ohio, to see 
how different policy decisions and approaches are enacted, and also to see how the makeup of 
the individual state might impact which of these fit best for each state. For example, southern 
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states such as California do not have to deal with the salting of highways and snow clearing that 
Ohio does, or at least not to the same degree. Examining pilot studies was a critical part of the 
analysis, as vehicle-miles traveled tax systems are often regarded as the solution to the gas tax 
problem. Due to that informal consensus, the analysis was more made more complete because it 
examined states that performed pilot studies that were more similar to Ohio, such as Oregon, and 
states that look much different than Ohio, such as California. By doing so, we can see how 
mileage-based user fees might work in a variety of states and see if their implementation would 
suit Ohio. The analysis will lean on both the comparison to other states, and the evaluation of 














An Analysis of the Future of Infrastructure Funding in Ohio 
Ohio is facing several changes that threaten the long-term viability of using the gas tax to 
fund the state’s transportation related projects. For decades the continually increasing average 
fuel-efficiency of vehicles in the United States has loomed as a threat on gas tax revenues. 
However, more recently the rise of electric and hybrid vehicles has accelerated the decline of gas 
tax revenues. For example, General Motors recently announced they would only be selling 
electric vehicles by 2035, and Elon Musk’s Tesla is planning to sell its first orders of electric 
semi-trucks in 2021 (Boudette and Davenport, 2021). This analysis has three parts, it will first 
examine electric vehicle fees (EV fees) and pilot programs, which are examining mileage-based 
user fees (MBUFS) as an alternative to the gas tax. This includes evaluating if Ohio’s EV fee is 
adequate. The second section will examine the potential indexation of the gas tax to inflation to 
increase revenues. Lastly, it will use pilot programs done by several states to examine if there is 
any long-term viability in the gas tax, and if there is a future in MBUFS as an alternative to the 
gas tax.  
 
Analysis Part I: Pilot Programs and Mileage-Based User Fees (MBUFS) 
Analyzing a series of states’ experience with the gas tax and comparing them to Ohio can 
identify possible solutions which could help Ohio address the decline of gas tax revenues. This 
part of the analysis will use the evaluation criteria laid out in the methodology, which are 
performance rankings, pavement condition, fungibility, electric vehicle (EV) market share, EV 
fees, and state gas tax revenues (adjusted for inflation).  First, this paper will examine Michigan 
and Pennsylvania, two states with many key factors in common with Ohio. Though similar to 
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Ohio in structure, these states have undertaken different policies which may be advantageous for 
Ohio to follow. Second, the analysis will then consider California, Colorado, and Oregon. These 
three states have all conducted pilot studies and are much more progressive in their respective 
approaches to transportation finance. All three states are important to evaluate and to compare 
with Ohio as they can help forecast the potential future of Ohio’s relationship with the gas tax. 
Lastly, there will be a summary of the key findings from the analysis and policy 
recommendations based on these findings.  
 The goal for the first section of states was to select states that would provide good 
comparison to Ohio. Michigan and Pennsylvania were selected for their similarities to Ohio. The 
rankings of Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Ohio are relatively close if both overall highway 
management performance and both rural and urban pavement conditions. Michigan and Ohio are 
close to each other in revenue per mile (Michigan at $5,762,856 in 2019 and Ohio at $7,545,688) 
but Pennsylvania’s revenue per mile ($13,325,716) in 2019 was almost double Ohio’s. This is 
surprising as Pennsylvania falls close to Ohio in both miles of road and in population, and this 
discrepancy may be due to their different approaches to supplementing the gas tax, which will be 
discussed below. All three states are relatively similar in geography and climate as well, another 
commonality that makes these states fit for comparison. One last similarity in these three states is 
their electric vehicle market share. Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Ohio all have roughly one 
percent market share of electric vehicles, which is a stark contrast to some of the other states 
studied here. However, each of these three states take differing policy approaches in how they 
manage transportation funds.  
 The key difference between Ohio and the comparison states of Michigan and 
Pennsylvania is indexation of the gas tax. Michigan indexes its gas tax to the consumer price 
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index (CPI), it does not have to actively manage the rate of its gas tax. Pennsylvania indexes its 
gas tax by a percentage of the wholesale price of gas. Due to this Pennsylvania does have to 
manually adjust its gas tax rate occasionally, but like Michigan, indexing their gas tax helps to 
prevent the decrease of the purchasing power of gas tax funds. Ohio does not index its gas tax, 
which means the rate of the gas tax must be actively managed by the state government, or else 
transportation funding will fall. As discussed in the Ohio case study, Ohio has raised its gas tax 
recently. Hiking a gas tax can be tricky sometimes though, which can be observed later in this 
paper with Colorado, who has failed to raise its gas tax for 24 years. Since raising the gas tax can 
be politically hard, Michigan and Pennsylvania have an advantage in maintaining the purchasing 
power of their gas tax revenues when compared to Ohio.  
 Ohio has been proactive with one method of raising gas tax revenues. This is the addition 
of an electric vehicle fee (EV fee). As the market share of EVs rise, it makes sense to charge 
them a registration fee to help cover the amount of money those drivers would be paying in gas 
taxes if their vehicles were not electric. Every state in this study besides Pennsylvania has 
enacted an EV fee, and there is a bill in Pennsylvania’s legislature currently that will add them to 
that list if passed. Ohio charges $200 for the annual registration of an electric vehicle, while 
Michigan only charges $135. Some states are opposed to high registration fees on electric 
vehicles, as they want to actively encourage these vehicles to become more commonplace. 
However, while Ohio’s EV fee is steeper than Michigan’s, it has a slightly higher percentage of 
electric vehicles on the road.  
 An article from the New York Times talks about the electric vehicle (EV) “take over” 
that is impending. States like Ohio need to be aware of just how near in the future electric 
vehicles may make up a considerable percentage of all vehicles on the road. Figure 9 is from this 
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Times article, and it shows that for almost all cars on the road to be electric by 2050, new plug-in 
sales would need to quickly ramp up to 100 percent in the next 15 years. While 100 percent sales 
may seem unrealistic, GM has already committed to selling only EVs by 2035. Not only that, but 
this figure also demonstrates that the growing sales and market share of EVs will cause them to 
make up a significant portion of vehicles on the road. Figure 10 contains the more accurate case 
to likely occur. If electric vehicle sales gradually ramped up to 60 percent over the next 30 years, 
as analysts of IHS Markit project, then around 40 percent of cars on the road would be EVs by 
2050. If electric vehicles make up anywhere near 40 percent of the driving public, it will have an 
undeniable and significant impact on gas tax revenues, forcing states’ hands into action regarding 
transportation finance. Therefore, a proactive solution is necessary, to ease the transition into the 
inevitable. Several tables created for this analysis will demonstrate what the impact of EV fees 
are and put into perspective how the use of electric vehicles and more fuel-efficient vehicles 
affect the amount of gas tax paid.  
Table 3 gives an estimate of what the average driver not driving an electric vehicle pays 
in gas taxes and compares it to the state’s EV fee. This calculation was made by taking average 
individual VMT, dividing by the average fuel efficiency, and multiplying by the gas tax rate. 
This produces an estimate of how much the average driver pays in gas taxes every year. Each 
state’s gas tax rate (as of 2019) is listed. Some do not come out to even numbers and some may 
even have multiple decimal places. This is because sometimes legislators raise gas taxes to a 
specific price, and sometimes they raise gas taxes by a percentage. Percentage changes can result 
is non-round numbers. Also, California’s gas tax was historically split into two parts, but was 
recently combined. Other parts of this paper add both portions of California’s gas tax rates 
together for one single rate. For most of the states, estimates from the specific state were able to 
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be used to complete calculations. For average fuel efficiency, California is the only state from 
this group that has its own calculation and standards on vehicle fuel efficiency. For VMT it was 
possible to gather estimates for each state, although some are more of approximations than 
others. Each state department of transportation records this data differently, which can cause 
variations in accuracy. Despite these flaws, this data allows a good approximation that makes 
analysis of electric vehicle fees and the gas tax possible. In each of the states on the table, 
electric vehicle drivers tend to pay less in taxes than those driving gas-powered vehicles. In Ohio 
that discrepancy is just $30, but for states like California and Pennsylvania the margin of 
difference is much more significant. For example, Californians who pay the EV fee pay $234.66 
less in taxes on average. Regardless of the margin, the set levels for EV fees in these states 
produce less tax revenue than the gas tax on average. As a result, as more drivers move to 
electric vehicles there will be an overall decrease transportation funding, unless the EV fee rates 
are changed.  
Table 3 adds another dimension to comparing the gas tax to EV fees, showing gas taxes 
paid but multiplying the VMT by 1.5 and .5 to show how the tax discrepancies are affected by 
how much driving a motorist does. Table 3 displays how the distance drivers drive on a yearly 
basis can affect how much they end up paying in gas taxes. Comparing this to each state’s EV 
fee further illustrates the inefficiencies in allowing drivers to pay an EV fee. It will result in some 
individuals payments not correlating to their amount of road usage. No matter if you drive a lot 
or a little, with the EV fee you pay a flat rate. The way the gas tax is better is that it at least 
proportionally tracks road usage, just not as accurately as it has in the past, due to the rise of 
alternative vehicles and the increase in fuel efficiency. The column showing 1.5 the VMT 
represents more active drivers’ average cost in gas taxes. The next column shows half VMT, 
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which represents less active drivers, who subsequently pay less in gas taxes. In California, 
Colorado and Pennsylvania, their complete range of gas tax expenditures, whether a more active 
(1.5 VMT) or less active (0.5 VMT) driver, still pay more in taxes that those paying an EV fee. 
In states such as Ohio and Michigan however, a less active driver might be able to pay less in 
taxes by driving a gas-powered vehicle rather than paying the EV fee. For example, based on 
VMT the range for estimated gas taxes paid for Ohio is $115 to $345. This means for electric 
vehicle owners who don’t drive much the $200 fee is not a bargain but for those who drive more 
miles on average, they are getting a discount on their driving cost. Meanwhile, California’s and 
Colorado’s low-end gas tax paid estimate is still more than their respective EV fees, meaning 
that, whether intentionally or not, there is a tax incentive to drive electric vehicles. The reason 
for analyzing this is that it illustrates the issues in determining the adequacy and viability of 
using EV fees as a source of revenue for Ohio roads. While the previous table displayed that 
often an electric vehicle fee is not keeping up with gas tax revenues, it becomes even more 
notable in Table 4. This table not only shows that the EV fee allows drivers of electric vehicles 
to not pay an equal share when it comes to financing the roads they use, it also shows that the 
drivers on the high VMT end could save $400 or more in California just by driving an electric 
vehicle.  
 California had wanted to push its fuel efficiency standards well past it’s current average 
of all vehicles at 25.2 miles per gallon (MPG). The regulation they had in place was that all new 
vehicles in California by 2026 would have to have an average MPG of at least 54.5. However, 
when President Trump took office in 2016, he rolled back the national fuel efficiency standards 
to 40 MPG by 2026 and made it so no state could have stricter fuel efficiency standards. 
President Biden rolled this back upon his election, and so now California’s standards can revert 
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to the 54.5 MPG requirement. Table 5 illustrates this change, with the first row displaying 
California’s average tax cost per driver if fuel efficiency standards are at 54.5, and the second 
row showing the same but with Trump’s cutback to 40. The difference on average in revenues 
between the Trump fuel standards and California’s fuel standards is more than $50 less revenue 
per driver (which alone is half of their electric vehicle fee in 2019). This table exemplifies how 
severely increased fuel efficiency can affect gas tax revenues. So, while this is a victory for 
California in terms of environment protection and standards, it will even further drastically 
impede their gas tax revenues in the following years. Increased fuel efficiency can deteriorate 
gas tax revenues very quickly, and California already has the highest tax rate on motor-fuel in 
the United States. 
 While Michigan and Pennsylvania worked well as comparison states to Ohio, it is also 
important to see what the difference in approach is for states who differ greatly from Ohio as 
they can help forecast what Ohio might expect to deal with in the future. California, Colorado, 
and Oregon are all three much different than Ohio, and these states differ with each other to an 
extent as well. The unifying characteristic between these three states is in policy approach- each 
state has implemented a pilot program studying a vehicle miles traveled (VMT) tax system. 
These states different approaches to transportation policy can help give further guidance to 
possible approaches to improving or replacing the gas tax in Ohio. Pilot programs have started to 
emerge in some states as professionals and practitioners point to the dwindling gas tax revenues. 
The pilot programs enact trials of the VMT tax, through different methods of tracking miles 
driven by drivers and charging them directly for road use this way. Another problem is that the 
gas tax may no longer be operating as a true user fee. The VMT tax is a way of returning 
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transportation funding to a truly user fee system. Neither Ohio, nor Pennsylvania and Michigan 
have enacted a pilot study to examine possible alternatives to the gas tax.  
The second group of states examined here have been much more progressive when it 
comes to transportation funding. California, Colorado, and Oregon each have implemented pilot 
programs to test the feasibility of alternatives to the gas tax. This policy approach is due to an 
issue common to all three states. All three states have dealt with decreasing gas tax revenues 
Before examining each state’s pilot program, this study will illustrate how declining or stagnant 
revenues drove these states to the search for an alternative. Figure 11 is a table of California’s 
gas tax revenues adjusted for inflation from 1994 to 2014. Governing created their graphs using 
data from the U.S. Census Bureau and then adjusting the numbers for inflation in 2014 dollars. 
California eliminated its state sales tax on gasoline in 2011 but simultaneously hiked per-gallon 
gasoline excise taxes. The drastic spike of 2011 is due to the hike of gas taxes that compensated 
for eliminating the state sales tax on gasoline, which were two distinct taxes. The state 
government raised their gas tax again in 2013, which explains the increase in revenues from 
2013 to 2014. If solely tracking revenues in 1994 and then in 2014, the result would be a large 
growth in gas tax revenues. However, that would be misleading. Especially since 2004, every 
year (excepting hikes of the tax) revenues consistently trended downwards. The only reason gas 
taxes in California have grown over two decades is that they have been propped up with multiple 
gas tax hikes and having the tax indexed to inflation. Simply put, after every gas tax hike, 
revenues begin to fall again a year later. While there are many contributing factors to this 




 Next, Colorado’s gas tax revenues from 1994 to 2014 show a similarity to California. 
Figure 12 is also produced by Governing, using U.S. Census Bureau Data. This graph has an 
upward trend up to 2001, afterwards the graph works down until 2014 where the revenue amount 
is almost the same as it was in 1994. Except for an unexplained rise in tax revenues in 2007, gas 
taxes have been gradually declining in Colorado since 2004. The revenues in this graph are 
adjusted for inflation in 2014 dollars. Colorado has failed to raise its gas tax since 1991. Even 
more damaging to Colorado’s transportation funding is that their average vehicle miles traveled 
has gone from 847.49 miles in 1991 to 1,234.57 miles in 2014 (Colorado DOT, 2014). This 
means while revenue has fallen back down to early 1990’s levels, the road usage has increased 
greatly, resulting in greater need for road improvements and maintenance.  The similarity to 
California is in Colorado’s downward trending gas tax revenues. Like California, it has overall 
increased its revenues since 1994, but is now set on a downward path. Even if Colorado did pass 
a gas tax hike, it could be argued it would continue to decline again after jumping up for one 
year. The motivation for their pilot program is undoubtedly caused by the need for more funding 
to maintain their infrastructure. Research conducted by the Southwest Energy Efficiency Project 
(SWEEP) concluded that Colorado missed out on up to $7 billion in transportation funding since 
1991, largely because the state has not raised its gas tax to keep up with inflation. The paper also 
noted that Colorado voters rejected ballot initiatives in 2018 and 2019 that would have generated 
additional funds for transportation. As a result of those failed initiatives, state legislators were 
forced to fill gaps in transportation investment by transferring money from the general fund. This 
need for better transportation funding is the motivating factor behind Colorado examining 
alternatives to the gas tax.  
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 Lastly, Figure 13 shows gas tax revenues in Oregon from 1994 to 2014. The graph shows 
revenues in 2014 were lower than they were in 1994 (after adjusting for inflation in 2014 
dollars). Oregon last raised its gas tax in 2011, yet after 2012 revenues began to decline again. 
These declining gas tax revenues show that Oregon, unlike its companions California and 
Colorado, have actually declined below their 1994 level in 2014. Not only have they fallen 
below 1994 levels, but without the spike created by their tax hike in 2011, they would be even 
further below previous levels. Oregon has a clear need for a better transportation funding 
mechanism, and that is why Oregon is also conducting research into alternatives for the gas tax.  
While California, Colorado, and Oregon have all conducted pilot programs, they have 
also approached other elements of transportation funding policy differently. California has 
indexed its gas tax to CPI, similarly to Michigan. Colorado and Oregon have not instituted an 
indexation in their states. The lack of indexation especially hurts Colorado, as they have not been 
able to raise their tax rate since 1991. However, all three states have instituted EV registration 
fees. California has its fee set at $100, Colorado’s is at $50, and lastly Oregon with its fee set at 
$110. EV registration fees have a larger impact for transportation funding in these states than 
they did for Ohio, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. That is because EV market share is much larger 
in California, Colorado, and Oregon. Oregon and Colorado both have 3% EV market share, 
which is 3 times the size of Ohio’s market share. California’s EV market share is higher still, at a 
nation high 8%. California also has the highest fuel efficiency standards in the nation. When 
taking these two factors into account, it is apparent that these states, especially California, are 
dealing with some issues that even further decline gas tax revenues.  
 Though pilot programs instituted in each of these three states vary, they are similar in 
their overall goal of evaluating the viability of different forms of a VMT tax. These studies take 
37 
 
the theory of replacing the gas tax with mileage-based user fees and put it to the test in the real 
world. Next this paper examines each states pilot program individually by using a set of similar 
criteria to each study, such as number of vehicles, length of study, and mileage recording 
methods. 
 California’s pilot program included 5,000 vehicles, the largest experiment of its kind at 
the time. Its test run lasted for nine months through March 2017, and it incorporated trucking 
companies along with individual motorists from every county in the state. Transport Topics, an 
organization the reports on transportation in America, said that “California gave participants 
seven ways to track their mileage, including odometer checks, permits for a set number of days, 
permits for a certain allotment of miles, plug-in devices, smartphones and in-vehicle telematics 
like OnStar or Acura Link” (Transport Topics, 2017). Permits allow drivers to pay up front and 
continually drive until they reach either the mileage or time limit set. At the expiration of the 
permit, drivers would need to renew or move to a different payment method. Smart phones and 
in vehicle telematics are both very convenient as they are already built into the driver’s phone or 
car. They use GPS to track mileage and have options that do and do not track the driver’s 
location, at the driver’s discretion. The wide array of options gave users a choice on how much 
privacy they desired. Privacy is one of the chief concerns when evaluating mileage-based user 
fees (MBUFs). Interesting to note, more than half of the participants in California’s study chose 
options that tracked their location regardless of having options that provided more privacy. This 
is viewed as a positive sign to the acceptability of a range of alternative measurement systems.  
 California made several conclusions at the end of their pilot program. The program used 
four different third-party vendors to collect mileage data and to issue invoices. This simulated 
how the infrastructure of a VMT tax might work if implemented. Another method tested in the  
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study was the ability to offer no-tech, low-tech, and high technology reporting and recording 
methods, to test viability and potentially to give users more choice in what system and privacy 
levels they are comfortable with. There were many different available options for payment and 
recording during the pilot program. Buying a time permit for unlimited driving during a set 
period of time was one option that required no-tech. Another no-tech option was manual 
recording of the odometer, with an inspection every 3 months or so. There is some concern of 
tampering with this option. Automated reporting with no location was a low-tech option that has 
the privacy of the low-tech, but the ease of automatic recording of mileage. This could be done 
with a plug-in device, or through use of a smart phone. Both mechanisms could also be used to 
record mileage with location, the high technology option. Feedback at the conclusion of the 
program was very positive, users reported being very happy with whichever recording method 
they chose. Despite these positives, the study did also conclude that while all the mileage 
reporting methods the program tested proved to be feasible, they are not yet ready to compete 
with the simplicity and public approval of the gas tax. While their system is not yet ready to 
implement, conducting a pilot program is a necessary step if a state is to make a switch from the 
gas tax to an alternative.  
Colorado also has implemented a pilot program. In Colorado gas tax rates have remained 
the same for 24 years, but they recently finished a four-month test with 150 drivers that explored 
different ways of tracking mileage for motorists. This test was motivated by their declining gas 
tax revenues driving them to search for alternatives. Similar to California, Colorado concluded 
that the road charge system it tested can be feasible as an alternative to the gas tax. Another 
conclusion made based on their study was that the technology-based systems were highly 
accurate and the most convenient option for users, while the manual option experienced low 
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compliance over the course of the pilot. The test drivers who chose technology recording options 
had 93 % satisfaction compared to just 55% satisfaction for those that chose the manual option 
(CDOT Executive Summary, 2017). There were several concerns the study identified as well. 
These were factors such as how they would charge mileage on non-public roads, or how they 
would handle capturing mileage for out-of-state drivers. California also identified out of state 
driver’s being a concern, although they believe developing a partnership with nearby states 
would enable them to capture the large majority of out of state motorists. This would likely erase 
the out of state motorist issue, so long as other states began moving in the direction of a VMT tax 
system and were willing to cooperate with each other. Colorado’s pilot program was deemed a 
success and is a promising step in the direction of moving on from the gas tax.  
 Lastly, Oregon conducted a pilot program of their own. They aimed to develop what they 
called the Oregon mileage fee concept. Their research was like Colorado’s and California’s as 
they are aiming to develop their own version of a VMT tax. The scope of Oregon’s testing was 
smaller than California’s in size but lasted a full year. They tested the technical and 
administrative feasibility of the road charge concept. Their program included 285 volunteer 
vehicles with 299 drivers, all based around Portland. Part of the limit to the program is that it 
could not capture the range or urban and rural environments to the extent that California and 
Colorado did. The motivation behind Oregon’s program was to replace the gas tax as they had 
identified major concerns with it. Oregon’s DOT identified a couple of these issues, saying that 
the gas tax does not directly link to the burden vehicles place on the roads and therefore do not 
operate as user fees. That would mean the roads funding is no longer connected to its equivalent 
use, which leads to inefficiencies in the funding of highway management. Typically, as seen by 
declining revenues, this inefficiency is leading to state departments of transportation being 
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underfunded. The other key problem identified was revenue erosion. Fuel-efficiency 
improvements have reduced gas tax payments per vehicle mile traveled, and fuel efficiency 
continues to rise. This motivated a pilot program to test how an alternative to the gas tax might 
operate.  
The conclusions of Oregon’s study were very promising. One of these conclusions was 
the viability of paying a mileage-based tax at the pump. This would result in minimal difference 
in process or administration for motorists, compared to how they pay the gas tax. Like the gas 
tax, collection of the mileage fee can be embedded within routine commercial transactions, with 
the bulk of it pre-paid by the distributor in the form of the gas tax. The research also concluded 
that the potential for evasion of this tax is low. Tampering with the on-vehicle device would 
result in automatic payment of the tax. That is thanks to a failsafe built into the mileage 
recording device. The difference between what is already paid in gas taxes and mileage fees will 
likely be small, providing little incentive to try to evade the mileage fee.  
One of the other positive conclusions of the study was that the projected cost of 
implementation and administration of the mileage fee system they tested was low. The Oregon 
DOT would incur operating costs for auditing and providing technical assistance to service 
stations and motorists. Management should cost roughly $1.0 million annually, an insignificant 
amount compared to expected annual mileage fee revenue. This study concluded MBUFs tend to 
be more expensive to administer than the current gas tax system, with the cost estimated at 
approximately five percent of collected revenue, compared to the current cost of the gas tax of 
two-to-five percent of collected revenues. However, the Oregon pilot study estimated that most 
of a MBUF program’s costs come from the initial capital expenditures needed to get started. 
These included the equipment, software, and installation costs. If the Oregon pilot is indicative 
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of what administrative costs might be, then a MBUF program would still net gain in revenues 
significantly when compared to the gas tax in the long-term. 
Examining both the similar and dissimilar states to Ohio gives valuable insight in how 
Ohio might handle its gas tax situation. Michigan and Pennsylvania show what different 
management methods might work in supplementing gas tax revenues for Ohio, especially 
because of how similar their characteristics are. However, turning to states that are dissimilar to 
Ohio provides insight as well. California is ahead of the curve when it comes to transportation, as 
it experiences problems Ohio may in the future (such as an 8% market share of EVs), and also is 
actively testing alternatives to the gas tax with its pilot program. These differences help to 
forecast what Ohio may face in the future and point to several recommendations that could work 
for Ohio. 
The discrepancy in fungibility between Ohio and its comparison states Michigan and 
Pennsylvania may explain why Ohio scores better overall in the Reason Foundations rankings of 
state highway management. However, this points to a lack of flexibility for Ohio when compared 
to Pennsylvania and Michigan. Those two states still have the option of cutting back on 
fungibility to secure more highway funds. Fungibility being so low in Ohio is seen as a positive 
when it comes to good highway management but may also be considered as a warning sign when 
it comes to decreasing gas tax revenues. Fungibility management is one option already closed to 






Analysis Part II: Gas Tax Revenues, CPI, and the Gas Price Index 
To better understand the role of inflation in gas tax revenues, it is helpful to understand 
how gas tax revenues evolve. Gas tax revenues depend upon the demand for gasoline and the tax 
revenue rate. The demand for gasoline can vary due to the price, to weather conditions, and the 
health (or lack thereof) of the economy. The gas tax rate is set by legislative action and does not 
change unless new legislation is passed, or it is indexed to change in tandem with an inflationary 
measure, such as the CPI index or the oil and gas price index. However, overtime the purchasing 
power of the tax rate can erode because of inflationary pressures.  This is vital because ceteris 
paribus inflation increases the amount of money needed to maintain Ohio’s roadways and 
bridges. So, while inflation may not be directly related to VMT, adjusting for inflation could 
potentially close this gap, making the gas tax more efficient and able to manage roadway funding 
more effectively. Figure 14 displays Ohio’s gas tax revenues from 1994 to 2019. The case study 
done on Ohio earlier in this paper describes the history of the gas tax in Ohio. Drawing back on 
that, the largest increase in Ohio’s gas tax rate was back in 2005, and that is the most significant 
period of growth in Figure 14. The state legislature had modified the motor fuel tax in 2003 
gradually raising the rate from 22 cents per gallon to 28 cents by July 1st, 2005. Outside of this 
anomaly, growth in gas tax revenues in Ohio have remained consistent but sluggish.  
Several states have used CPI or gas prices to index their gas taxes to maintain the 
purchasing power of the tax rate. As described in the literature review, this is one of the ways 
legislators today are trying to bolster gas tax revenues from their national stagnation and decline. 
However, these approaches are only an estimate of the changes in the cost of the resources which 
might not accurately reflect differences in road usage. The following analysis compares changes 
in Ohio’s gas tax revenues to both CPI and gas price changes, to examine how they are related 
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and if they might be effective means for strengthening gas tax revenues. For this analysis the 
formula gas tax revenues equal gallons purchased multiplied by the gas tax rate (cents per 
gallon) was used. The equation was developed to evaluate changes in gas tax revenue over 
time. Gas tax revenues vary by changes in the gas tax rate and in the number of gallons 
purchased.  The number of gallons purchased depends upon prices, and a variety of other factors 
such as income, which explains the clear drop in each graph following the Great Recession.  
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is a measure of the average change over time in the 
prices paid by urban consumers for a market basket of consumer goods and services. CPI is 
calculated by averaging price changes of a set list of consumer goods and services. Changes in 
the CPI are used to gauge the change of the cost of living. The CPI is one of the most frequently 
used statistics for identifying periods of inflation or deflation. Average price data for automotive 
fuel/gas prices is commonly available on its own but is accounted for inside of CPI. According to 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, changes in gas prices have more of an impact on short-run 
movements in the Consumer Price Index than anything else, although they only account for six 
percent of CPI calculations (Crawford, 2013).  
Some states adjust their gas tax rates by the CPI, others use an index of oil and gas prices. 
For example, Michigan indexes their gas tax rate to changes in CPI, while California indexes 
their gas tax to both CPI and changes in gas prices. Figure 15 compares the percent changes in 
both CPI and an index of the prices of gas and oil in the United State. As might be expected, CPI 
is more volatile as it tracks the changing inflation rate or more goods and services, some of 
which may be more sensitive to changes in the economy. This illustrates what Crawford wrote 
above about how large of an impact gas price changes have on overall CPI. The impact of the 
Great Recession (2007-2009) is clearly displayed. As a result of the Great Recession CPI can be 
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seen changing negatively in 2009, while gas prices dropped in percent change by a much smaller 
margin. Based on the graph, either CPI or gas prices could be used to effectively index the gas 
tax and help it to match increased demand or roadway usage. CPI would likely offer a more 
variable change in the gas tax, while the changes if indexed to changes in gas prices would be 
more consistent. This is inferred by the smaller fluctuations in percentage change in gas prices.  
While it displays correlation to both measures, the changes in Ohio’s gas tax revenues 
seem much more closely tied to changes in CPI than in gas prices. Gas price percentage growth 
is consistently around 2%, with little variation outside of that range. The CPI rates are closer to 
3% on average, but they also experience drastic falls in growth, becoming negative briefly due to 
the Great Recession. The CPI’s more drastic changes is because it is made up of a series of 
consumer goods and services that track the changes in prices of goods. As a reaction to the Great 
Recession consumer spending drastically fell, which caused producers and service providers to 
drop prices to meet the reduced demand.  
The impact of indexing Ohio’s gas tax to CPI or gas prices would both function 
differently but would both likely help Ohio’s tax revenues to grow faster than they do currently. 
If indexed to gas prices, which do not change as significantly to Ohio’s gas tax revenues, it 
would likely cause Ohio’s gas tax revenues to grow at a more consistent pace, rather than 
fluctuating so greatly. In the case of CPI, indexing the gas tax would result in still less 
fluctuation, but not to the degree that indexing to gas price changes would. While the CPI index 
achieves greater highs than the gas price index at points, it also has much lower lows, and is less 
consistent. These observations point towards gas prices as being a better index for Ohio’s gas tax 
as it would help to achieve more consistent and greater growth in revenues. However, there is 
still an argument to be made for indexing to CPI. While it could cause tax revenues to decline on 
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occasion due to its variability, what it really does when it is decreasing revenues is lowering the 
gas tax rate. Since CPI growth tends to turn negative only in severe economic crises, it could be 
argued it is a perfect time for a tax break for citizens dealing with economic hardship. This might 
be true especially considering how the gas tax does place a disproportionate burden on the poor.  
The final graph (Figure 16) shows nominal gas tax revenues (in millions of dollars), 
along with two indexed gas tax revenues for comparison of the impact of two methods of 
indexing Ohio’s gas tax revenues. The brown solid line displays Ohio gas tax revenues indexed 
to CPI inflation, and the blue solid line displays the same but indexed to the gas and oil price 
index. This graph displays that gas tax revenues would be higher if indexed to inflation, and as 
discussed already there would be benefits to either or both forms of indexation. That does not 
include the exception of 2008, where CPI rates would have decreased the tax rate temporarily 
due to the financial recession. Unfortunately, the graph also displays how indexation does not 
make drastic improvements to revenues, and while it does increase them consistently, it by no 
means can truly alleviate the declining purchasing power of the tax revenues, especially with the 
growth of electric vehicle sales, and examples such as General Motors recently declaring they 
would only be selling electric vehicles by 2035. With these factors in mind, it appears indexation 







Conclusion: Ohio’s Next Steps 
Ohio has faced several issues that have caused a decrease in the purchasing power of gas 
tax revenues, especially when considering the correlating increases in vehicle miles traveled. A 
large part of this is due to increased fuel efficiency, although the tax rate only being raised twice 
since the early 1990’s has not aided the tax rate in keeping up with inflation either. Headlines 
like GM moving to all electric vehicles by 2035 drives home the other issue; more and more 
vehicles on the road are not using motor-fuel. If this is not addressed, state departments of 
transportation such as Ohio’s will either be strapped for cash and further road deterioration will 
occur, or their state legislature will divert more funds to them from elsewhere, reducing funding 
for other essential programs. Ohio needs to look to new options for measuring and taxing 
roadway usage.  
The first section of the analysis explored the effectiveness of electric vehicle registration 
fees as a supplement to transportation funding, applying it to Ohio and several other states. That 
section of the analysis highlighted that the current average combustion engine driver still 
contributes more to transportation funding than an EV fee paying individual by roughly $30 in 
Ohio, although this gap is wider in many states. For example, in California an estimate of motor-
fuel drivers’ VMT who drive less than average, still would tend to pay $50 or more in taxes 
towards roads than their electric vehicle counterparts, even if the EV drivers drive much more 
than average (Table 3).  
The same section also explored pilot programs. Several states have conducted pilot 
programs examining mileage-based user fees (MBUFs also known as VMT tax) as an alternative 
measure of road usage. States such as Oregon and California have explored and implemented 
different versions of a VMT tax in small scale, with positive results. California’s study was more 
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robust, testing 5,000 vehicles with their system. While Colorado’s program only tested 150 
drivers, it demonstrates a good starting point for smaller or wary states who want to evaluate 
alternatives to the gas tax system. These pilot programs demonstrate the ability of MBUFs to 
track road usage, maintain privacy, tax equally, and most importantly concerning this research, 
could keep transportation financing revenues stable, and even increasing. This is because 
MBUFs are not affected by the energy source, or the energy efficiency of vehicles. There would 
be no need to regularly raise the VMT tax rate to keep up with improved fuel efficiency, which 
can have a large effect on tax revenues (as seen in Table 5). The operate more fairly because they 
tax each driver based on how much they drive, meaning that it would operate as a true user-fee. 
In the Ohio Case Study we identified the gas tax was chosen to finance transportation due to 
technological limitations of the time, and because it operated as a user-fee, taxing each driver 
based on how much they used the road, albeit indirectly by taxing the price of gas. As motor-fuel 
vehicles have become more efficient, and more electric vehicles hit the pavement, the gas tax has 
become a less accurate measure of usage, and thus can no longer be considered a true user-fee. 
Using the technology of today, it is possible to have a direct user-fee, in the form of a vehicle 
miles traveled tax system. As shown by the multiple successful pilot programs, the technology 
and apparatus are already available to implement this type of tax. 
The second section of the analysis studied gas tax indexation, or different methods of 
keeping tax rates up with inflation, without the need of legislative action, which can be slow due 
to political gridlock. The two most common methods of this were examined, being indexation to 
the Consumer Prices Index, and the Gas & Oil Prices index. This method of increasing gas tax 
revenues performs more like a bandage than a permanent solution. Figure 16 shows that 
unfortunately, indexation does not drastically raise revenues, so it by no means can truly alleviate 
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the declining purchasing power of the tax revenues. While the gas tax rate could be raised with 
this and other legislative methods, none of them solve the underlying issues of the different rates 
of fuel efficiency and different fuel sources. These issues cause individuals to be taxed 
unequally, and not accurately capture their road usage. Indexation does not turn the gas tax rate 
back into a user-fee. While in the short run it could immediately raise revenues, it has no long-
term viability in accurately capturing the demand for road usage. 
The best path forward for Ohio can be identified, at least in a broad manner, by using the 
preceding analysis. First, Ohio must recognize that the motor-fuel tax is no longer operating as a 
user fee and is not accurately capturing the demand for road usage. The gas tax has become 
increasingly divorced from road usage because of more fuel-efficient vehicles driving farther on 
a gallon of gas than ever before and alternative vehicles not even using motor-fuel for 
propulsion. Once the deteriorated connection between the gas tax and vehicle-miles driven is 
accepted, serious alternatives can be evaluated and implemented.  
The second step is that Ohio must find a more accurate measure of roadway usage and 
demand for usage. While this could come in the form of toll roads or alternative-vehicle fees, a 
mileage-based user fee would immediately and accurately measure road usage by individuals and 
allow the government to tax the driving public more efficiently and fairly. Some of the 
advantages of using a MBUF is that it would serve as an extremely accurate measure of roadway 
usage, and could more efficiently and fairly replace both the motor-fuel tax and alternative 
vehicle fees, as the method of propulsion is not a factor of MBUFs. Also, as the Oregon pilot 
study showed, while the cost of administration is higher, the net gains in revenue far surpass the 
gas tax system. Charging drivers per mile results in drivers paying proportionally for the exact 
amount of the road that they use. 
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To accomplish the implementation of a mileage-based user fee, it may be valuable for 
Ohio to conduct a pilot study such as California, Oregon, and Colorado have done. This would 
provide a testing period and potentially serve as a bridge to implementation of a mileage-based 
user fee. While this is not necessarily the only path to implementing a MBUF, it would put Ohio 
in the leading group of states looking to the future of transportation financing, rather than falling 
behind or resisting the change, which would undoubtedly be problematic for the driving public, 
legislators, and state government employees. Ohio must look to alternatives to the motor-fuel 
tax, and the implementation of MBUFs are the leading candidate for an accurate measure of 
roadway demand that would increase transportation funding revenues. A MBUF that used GPS 
tracking to a secure database, and billed individuals for their usage on a monthly basis just as any 
other utility, is clearly the best and most realistic option when it comes to replacing the gas tax 
with a system that would accurately measure and tax individuals’ road usage. If Ohio does not 
follow these steps, or a similar approach, the gas tax will continue to show cracks and 
inefficiencies that will hurt Ohio’s roads, drivers, and economy. The worse roads become, the 
more they cost drivers. The costs associated with auto repair greatly outweigh the typical range 
of gas tax paid per year (typically between $200 and $300 annually, Figure 4). These steps would 
not only help Ohio avoid the side effects of an issue that has been forecasted and predicted for 
decades, it would establish Ohio as a forward-thinking state that is prepared for the future as new 










Source: Cleveland 2019 
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Oregon 12 23 15 3,603,684    8,863  4.21 Larger, varied 3% 
Colorado 36 28 47 3,660,538    9,506 5.75 Dissimilar 3% 






Michigan 30 42 34 5,762,856  10,200  9.98 Similar 1% 
Pennsylvani
a 35 32 32 13,325,716    7,945 
12.8 
Similar 1% 
Ohio 18 29 31 7,545,688  10,253  11.69 N/A 1% 
Sources: Federal Highway Administration, ODOT Annual Reports, U.S. Census Bureau, National Conference of State 
Legislatures, EPA Annual Report, Reason Foundation State Rankings, and the U.S. Department of Energy 
Table 2: 
State 









Market Share of 
State (in 2018) 
Oregon No 110 Y 3% 
Colorado No 50 Y 3% 
California Yes 100 Y 8% 
Michigan Yes 135 N 1% 
Pennsylvania Yes None  N 1% 
Ohio 




Sources: Federal Highway Administration, ODOT Annual Reports, U.S. Census Bureau, National Conference of State 






Table 3: Projected Electric Vehicle fee compared to average gas tax paid per year per individual.  
 
Sources: Federal Highway Administration, U.S. Census Bureau, National Conference of State Legislatures, and the U.S. 
Department of Energy 
 
Table 4: Electric vehicle fee compared to average gas tax paid per year per individual, with 
vehicle miles traveled ranges of 0.5 and 1.5. 
 
Sources: Federal Highway Administration, U.S. Census Bureau, Ohio Department of Transportation, National Conference of 














Gas Tax Rate          
(cents per gallon)
Estimated                     
Gas Tax Paid            
(Dollars Per Year)
Electric Vehicle Fee
Ohio 14050 23.5 38.5 230 200
California 13500 25.2 62.47 335 100
Colorado 13664 23.5 22 128 50
Michigan 13268 23.5 41.98 237 135
Pennsylvania 11243 23.5 58.7 281 0
State
Gas Tax Paid Per 
Year
Gas Rate Based on 
Vehicle Miles 
Traveled (0.5)
Gas Rate Based 




Ohio 230 115 345 200
California 335 167 502 100
Colorado 128 64 192 50
Michigan 237 119 356 135
Pennsylvania 281 140 421 0
59 
 
Table 5: Changes in Average Gas Tax Paid Based on Changes in Average Fuel Efficiency 
 
Sources: Federal Highway Administration, U.S. Census Bureau, National Conference of State Legislatures, California State 






Source: New York Times 
 
 














154.74$            100 13500 54.5 62.47
































































































































































































Ohio Gas Tax Revenues From 1994-2019





-Wagner, I. (2021, February 23). Gas prices by year in the United States 1990-2019. Statista. And the U.S. Bureau of Labor 













-ODOT Annual Reports, U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, (FRED) Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL, April 19, 2021. 
Footnote: To calculate the potential revenues with indexation to CPI and gas prices, several steps 
were followed. First, gas tax revenues were divided by the tax rate for any given year to get gallons 
purchased. Second, gallons purchased were multiplied by the gas tax rate times 1 + the inflation rate to 



























Potential Gas Tax Revenues if adjusted for Consumer Price Index 
or Gas Price Index
Ohio Gas Tax Revenues (Nominal) Potential Revenues adjusted by CPI








Title Author Data Summary 






  •Research question- 
who pays the gas tax, 
is it regressive and 
how does tax 
incidence affect the 
regressivity?                                
•Purpose/motivation- 
show that the gas tax 
disproportionately 
affects low income 
households and 
individuals.                                  
•Key Findings-can't 
ignore burdens on 
low income 
individuals from 
reliance on gas taxes. 
Gasoline taxes could 
be increased without 





those who are low 
income. 
2001 Reconsider the 
Gas Tax: 
Paying for 
What You Get 
Jeffrey Brown   •Research purpose- 
reviewing the origins 
of the gas tax to see 
how to develop an 
equitable and 
efficient successor.                     
•Key Findings- 
Benefit of gas tax was 
that it worked as a 
user fee, and the cost 
to administer it was 




today do not have 
lost costs.  
2004 Benefit Taxes 
and User Fees 
In Theory And 
Practice 
David G Duff   •Argument- user fees 
(benefit taxes) are 
preferable to general 
taxes in some 
instances, and 
inferior in other 
instances.           
•Key Findings- user 
fees have efficiency 
and fairness benefits 




and restructured user 
fees/benefit taxes for 
transportation 








  •Purpose- Give a 
general background 
of the motor fuel tax 
replacement options, 
and the feasibility 
(politically) of these 
options.                                      
•Suggests that 
electronic tolling of 
road use may be 


















•Purpose- Primer on 




funding.                  
•Key Findings- Gas 
tax receipts are 
beginning to plateau. 
VMT is increasing 
faster than fuel 
consumption.  




Martin Wachs   •Purpose- raise 
awareness of this 
"quiet crisis", and 
advocate solutions.                                     
•Key findings- 
Erosion of user fees, 
more specifically, the 
gas tax is no longer 
working as a user fee 
as it had in the past. 
As the highway 
system grows, so 
does the cost of 
maintaining what we 
have, let alone build 
new projects. 
Worsening 
congestion is a 
product of having to 
dedicate funding to 
maintain, with 
nothing left to 
expand or innovate. 
Increased borrowing 
through bonds is one 
solution to the 
shortcomings of the 
motor fuel tax. 
Electronic tolling also 
a possible solution.   
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NA •Purpose- Make the 
argument that 
gasoline tax revenue 
should not be 
diverted to projects 
that are only 
tangentially related 
to transportation and 
tend to be politcally 
motivated.                      
• Main Arguments- 
Gas tax revenue 
spent on public 
education, museums, 
graffiti removal, and 
parking garages. HTF 
was established 
under Eisenhower as 
a temporary 
instrument, but is still 





funding. Need more 
oversight to ensure 
revenue from gas 
taxes is used to build 
roads, and not 
diverted for other 
causes.   
2008 The Road… 
Less Traveled: 
An Analysis of 





  •Purpose- Analyze 
trends of VMT in the 
U.S.                                  
•Findings- VMT 
plateau from 2004 to 
2008. Passenger 
vehices (cars and 
personal trucks) 
dominate the share 
of VMT. Reduced 
driving hurts 
transportation 
revenue streams. If 
VMT trends continue, 
there will have to be 




finance is done.  
2009 Performance 
Driven: A New 






    
2009 The Surface 
Transportation 
Authorization 





    
2009 Paying Our 










  •Findings and 
recommendations- 
real highway 
spending has fallen 
by 50 percent since 
the federal HTF was 
established. Since 
1993, the federal gas 
tax has a loss in 
purchasing power of 
33 percent. The 
reliance on gas based 
taxes for funding 
transportation is not 
sustainable in the 
long term and is likely 
to erode quicker than 
previously thought.  
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  •Purpose- to expand 
the framework for 
outreach about policy 
measures designed to 
address pressing 
transportation 
problems, by looking 
more closely at the 
underlying 
mechanism driving 




to help build 
transportation policy 
support.  












    









Jr., Adeel Lari 
NA Purpose- The public 
does not understand 
why there is an issue 
with the gas tax. This 
paper sets the stage 
for a policy discussion 
on 
transportation-
related user fees and 
lays the groundwork 










    















2013 Road User 
Fees Instead of 
Fuel Taxes: 






FHWA, USDOT   




Jeff Davis   •Research Question- 
Is a never-ending 
series of bailouts of 
the HTF by general 
revenues the best 
way to fund future 
infrastructure 
investments?                       
•Findings- revenue 
for the HTF is 
projected to be $39 
Billion per year over 
the next decade, and 
in 2014 the HTF's 
spending 
commitments totaled 
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2015 Impacts of 
Energy 
Developments 








  • purpose- document 
the economic impact 
of heavy truck traffic 
related to energy 
development on the 





to minimize and pay 
for the damage 
caused by heavy 
loads are also 
documented.                  
•methods- a review 










agencies in five states 




2015 Is It Time to 





Joel Wood   •Purpose- Determine 
the proper gasoline 
tax in the GTHA.               
•Results- recommend 
an optimal gasoline 
tax of 40.57 cents, 
which is much higher 
than the current 24.7 
cents.  
2016 The Road 

















the future of 
road 
infrastructure 







    
2017 Navigating an 
Uncertain 







•Purpose- Show the 
failing of gas tax 
revenue and discuss 
options for funding 
that would be 
politically acceptable                      
• Findings- Today 
three technologies 






and ride sharing. The 
increase in fuel 
economy and greater 
adoption of electric 
vehicles is further 
hurting the revenues 
of the HTF. Since the 
Great Recession the 
HTF has relied on 
transfers for a 
significant portion of 
its funding.                       
• Interesting Facts- 3 
models of electric 
vehicles in 2010, and 












    
2019 Vehicle Fleet 
turnover and 
David Keith     
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the future of 
fuel economy 
2019 Fuel Economy, 
Electric 
Vehicles, and 







  •Purpose- examine 
how fuel tax policies 
affect the generation 
of revenue to 
maintain the US road 
infrastructure.  











FHWA •Findings- expanding 
fleets of hybrid and 
electric vehicles are 




fuel economy is 
slowly reducing the 
average amount of 
fuel used per mile of 
travel. The CBO 
projects that from 




spending will average 
roughly $18 billion 
annually.  
2020 2019 EPA 
Automotive 
Trends 
EPA NA   
Ohio 
Section 






















Where do We 
Go from Here? 
Jerry Wray   •Purpose-Ohio’s 
highways are 
essential to keeping 
and creating new 
jobs. Advocates more 
funding for DOT                                
• the state’s highway 
budget faces a $1.6 
billion shortfall, 
which will force high-
priority projects to 
face serious 
completion delays       








  •Purpose-  offer ACEC 
of Ohio’s position 
relative to highway 
infrastructure 
condition 
and funding and to 
offer solutions to 
achieve positive and 
continuous results for 
the public and private 
sectors calling Ohio 





further raise of gas 
tax, allow TIDs to 
generate further gas 
tax revenue, VMT tax 
revenue, eliminate 
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for revenue collection 
for Oregon's roads 
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on VMT 
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